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NOTE
IMPROVINGEMPLOYERACCOUNTABILITY IN A
WORLDOFPRIVATEDISPUTERESOLUTION
Hope Brinn*
Private litigation is the primary enforcement mechanism for employment
discrimination laws like Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
many related state statutes . But the expansion of extrajudicial dispute resolu-
tion—including both arbitration and prelitigation settlement agreements—
has compromised this means of enforcement . This Note argues that state-
enacted qui tam laws can revitalize the enforcement capacity of private liti-
gation and provides a roadmap for enacting such legislation .
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INTRODUCTION
Private litigation is the primary enforcement mechanism of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the nation’s landmark employment discrimina-
tion law.1 Many other federal statutes designed to protect workers—such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),2 the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),3 and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)4—also share this en-
forcement scheme.5 But based in part on a changing litigation landscape
over the last several decades, private litigation has become increasingly inef-
fective at holding employers accountable for violations of these types of laws.
Rather than resolving legal disputes through litigation, parties have in-
creasingly relied on predispute arbitration agreements and prelitigation set-
tlement agreements, two forms of extrajudicial dispute resolution.6 Most
employees are now required to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of
1. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1137, 1148–50 (2012) (noting that only 2 percent of job discrim-
ination suits were brought by the federal government between 2000 and 2010); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
2 . See 42 U.S.C. § 12188.
3 . See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
4 . See id . § 2617(a).
5. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 442
(2007).
6. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 1 (2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2JV-
TSL3]; Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment Settlements,
NATION (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-to-end-the-silence-around-
sexual-harassment-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/KDW8-2UCR] (“Confidentiality agreements
in sexual-harassment and -discrimination claims have become standard practice . . . .”).
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employment,7 a practice upheld by the Supreme Court.8 In these agreements,
employees promise to resolve all future disputes with their employers in pri-
vate arbitration instead of in court.9 These agreements hinder the effective-
ness of the mechanism Congress created to enforce these protective laws. But
even employees free from arbitration agreements are unlikely to ever file
employment discrimination claims.10 Instead, aggrieved employees typically
settle before ever filing a lawsuit, usually with both parties bound to confi-
dentiality.11 Both arbitration and prelitigation settlement agreements shield
facts surrounding the alleged misconduct from public view.
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that it does not view
this pattern of increased out-of-court dispute resolution as problematic, par-
ticularly with respect to arbitration.12 In the Court’s view, employees bound
by arbitration agreements are still capable of vindicating all their statutory
rights as employees; claim resolution simply takes place in a different, speed-
ier forum.13 Empirical research, however, indicates the opposite. Employees
7. COLVIN, supra note 6, at 12.
8 . See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (holding that the employ-
ees whose contracts contain arbitration provisions may not circumvent those provisions by
joining class action lawsuits); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (con-
fining the scope of § 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act to exempt only employment of transpor-
tation workers); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that
ADEA claims may be subject to arbitration).
9 . See, e .g ., Asfaw v. Lowe’s HIW, Inc., No. LA CV14–00697 JAK (AJWx), 2014 WL
1928612, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“This agreement to arbitrate means that there will be
no court or jury trial of disputes between you and Lowe’s HIW, Inc. which arise out of your
employment or the termination of your employment. This agreement to arbitrate is intended
to be broad and to cover, to the extent otherwise permitted by law, all such disputes, including
but not limited to those arising out of federal and state statutes and local ordinances . . . .”
(quoting Declaration of Dominique Sherie Gilmore in Support of Defendant Lowe’s HIW,
Inc.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss Representative Action Claims at 4, Asfaw,
2014 WL 1928612 (No. LA CV14–00697 JAK (AJWx)), ECF No. 13-1)); #DumpVenable for Its
Deception, PEOPLE’S PARITY PROJECT (Feb. 4, 2019), http://www.pipelineparityproject.org/
dumpvenable-for-its-deception/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Each [Venable em-
ployee] and Venable LLP mutually, unconditionally and irrevocably agree that any claim, dis-
pute or controversy regarding or relating to any matter whatsoever, including without
limitation the employment, partnership, separation from employment . . .MUST be submitted
to arbitration . . . . [T]his Mandatory Arbitration Provision shall also apply . . . in any context
that involves Venable.”).
10 . E .g ., Russell-Kraft, supra note 6 (noting the large percentage of employment claims
resolved via settlements before employees file a lawsuit).
11 . E .g ., id .
12 . See, e .g ., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626–27 (1985).
13 . Id . at 628 (holding that “if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by
a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that inten-
tion will be deducible from text or legislative history”).
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who sign such agreements are less likely to make a claim against their em-
ployer in any forum.14
The confidential nature of extrajudicial dispute resolution makes public
enforcement through private litigation difficult, frustrating the overall pur-
pose of employment discrimination laws. Arbitration is a largely confidential
process.15 Similarly, pre-suit settlement agreements resolve disputes outside
formal court structures and nearly always include confidentiality provi-
sions.16 Such confidentiality is not possible in the vast majority of lawsuits, in
which complaints are public records. Although confidentiality may encour-
age settlement and thus reduce the economic strain on the courts,17 the se-
crecy makes it difficult to raise awareness of corporate misconduct or alert
other aggrieved employees who might not know that they could make simi-
lar claims.18
In qui tam actions, private individuals sue for a penalty, part of which
the individual receives as an incentive and part of which the government re-
ceives as the enforcement agency.19 In essence, the government “hires” pri-
vate individuals (called relators) to enforce its own laws.20 This Note
examines how states can use qui tam laws to address the enforcement chal-
lenges that extrajudicial dispute resolution creates for employment discrimi-
nation laws.21 Part I describes the interaction between employment
discrimination laws and private dispute resolution mechanisms. Part II ex-
amines how states can potentially use qui tam laws to enforce employment
discrimination laws against the backdrop of widespread private dispute reso-
lution. In particular, it examines case law surrounding two existing qui tam
statutes, the federal False Claims Act (FCA) and the California Private At-
14. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
699–700 (2018).
15 . Id . at 680.
16 . See, e .g ., Russell-Kraft, supra note 6.
17. Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settle-
ments and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 440 (2005).
18 . See Estlund, supra note 14, at 681. A recent study of sexual assault survivors suggests
that “first movers”—victims who are the first person to accuse another of sexual misconduct—
incur higher negative consequences for reporting by way of heightened disbelief, retaliation,
exposure, and stigma. ANJANA RAJAN ET AL., CALLISTO: A CRYPTOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO
DETECT SERIAL PREDATORS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 2–3 (2018), https://
www.projectcallisto.org/callisto-cryptographic-approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FPE-KSVE].
Accordingly, survivors of sexual misconduct were far more likely to report misconduct when
they believed that other individuals were victimized by the same assailant. Id . Workplace poli-
cies and practices that promote secrecy increase the odds that victims will perceive themselves
as first movers and will thus be less likely to ever make a report.
19 . Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
20 . See, e .g ., United States ex rel . Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932
(2009).
21. Although this Note only examines the use of qui tam laws to enforce employment
discrimination laws, legislators could likely apply this structure to other public interest laws
including those outside of the employment context.
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torneys General Act (PAGA). Part III outlines a proposal for states that pre-
serves enforcement of employment laws via private litigation while respect-
ing the limits placed on states by the FAA and the right to make contracts.
I. HOW PRIVATEDISPUTERESOLUTIONUNDERMINES EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION ENFORCEMENT
Recognizing the limitations of federal agencies, Congress sought to em-
power private litigants to enforce employment discrimination laws.22 But as
mandatory extrajudicial dispute resolution expands, private litigants are less
able to serve the public regulatory function that Congress created for them.23
The confidentiality norms and claim-suppression effects associated with ex-
trajudicial dispute resolution undermine the private enforcement model that
Congress envisioned for employment discrimination laws.
A. Private Litigation as Public Regulation
The United States relies primarily on private litigants to enforce a num-
ber of laws, including those that govern employment discrimination.24 This
approach has been part of the American political structure since the coun-
try’s founding and differs from the public regulatory approach favored in
most European countries, which centralizes enforcement in regulatory agen-
cies.25 Both the private and public regulatory approaches have tradeoffs.
Although the public regulatory approach avoids the challenges associat-
ed with extrajudicial resolution, it is rife with inefficiency and unpredictabil-
ity.26 Federal agencies, for example, are subject to political will. Accordingly,
resources and agendas can ebb and flow depending on the political party in
power.27 Further, information gaps make it difficult for agencies to effective-
ly learn about employer misconduct.28 Private parties, however, do not face
these same concerns. An aggrieved employee, for instance, has to expend
fewer resources to obtain information about wrongdoing.29 After all, that
employee himself was the one to experience the misconduct.
But the private regulatory approach also has downsides. Critics of pri-
vate enforcement regimes argue that they empower judges to create public
22. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558, at 1 (1976) (“The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights
statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the Unit-
ed States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many
instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to
correct the illegality.”).
23 . See COLVIN, supra note 6; Russell-Kraft, supra note 6.
24. Glover, supra note 1, at 1149.
25 . Id . at 1140, 1147.
26 . See id . at 1152–54.
27 . See id . at 1142 n.10, 1152 & n.56.
28 . Id . at 1154–55.
29 . Id . at 1184.
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policy, discourage voluntary cooperation with law enforcement, and lead to
inconsistent and confusing doctrine.30 Because enforcement through private
litigation is “fragmented and uncoordinated,” such a regime may reduce the
impact of the underlying legislation.31 And compared to public regulatory
bodies, private litigants often have inferior access to the comprehensive data
needed to successfully litigate employment discrimination cases.32 Finally, as
this Note argues, a private enforcement regime allows parties to contract
around regulatory laws, preventing enforcement altogether.
B. The Widespread Use of Employee Arbitration and Prelitigation
Settlement Agreements
Mandatory arbitration agreements and prelitigation settlements are
popular among employers for anticipating and resolving disputes with em-
ployees. Although these devices differ in a few key ways, particularly with
respect to where bargaining power lies, they frequently share several com-
mon features, including deregulation and confidentiality.
Mandatory arbitration policies require employees, as a condition of their
employment, to agree to resolve legal disputes with their employer through
arbitration instead of going to court.33 In arbitration, the parties choose an
individual to adjudicate the case in accordance with their predetermined
agreement. Because arbitration is generally deregulated, private, and deliber-
ately secret, it can be difficult to generalize about what the employee arbitra-
tion process actually looks like.34
Most arbitration agreements contain a contractual guarantee of confi-
dentiality.35 This guarantee is not imposed by federal statute.36 Instead, the
parties agree to it.37 Employers, often repeat players in arbitral proceedings,
30. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 667
(2013).
31 . Id . at 671.
32 . See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 369 (1984).
33. COLVIN, supra note 6, at 2.
34. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Out-
comes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2011) (“Despite the intensity of focus on
public policy issues relating to employment arbitration, solid empirical data on this topic have
proven slow and difficult to gather. Part of the reason for this is the lack of publicly available
data on arbitration. Most empirical research has had to rely on cases or files for which individ-
ual arbitration service provider organizations have provided access. The resulting data sets
have tended to be relatively small in size and potentially lacking representativeness of the
broader population of arbitration cases.”).
35 . See Estlund, supra note 14, at 680. But confidentiality is not a fundamental aspect of
arbitration. Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1255 (2006).
36 . See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 482–84 (2006).
37 . Id .
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may benefit from such confidentiality agreements.38 When employment ar-
bitrations are confidential, the employer is effectively shielded from embar-
rassing allegations, whether true or unfounded.39 This protection from
public scrutiny can save employers significant costs associated with negative
publicity.40 Given this potential benefit, a majority of predispute arbitration
agreements include confidentiality provisions.41
Over the last twenty-five years, the use of employee arbitration agree-
ments has grown substantially. In 2018, 56 percent of private-sector,
nonunion employees were subject to mandatory arbitration agreements,
amounting to over sixty million workers.42 Of employers that mandate arbi-
tration, 39 percent had adopted their mandatory arbitration policies within
the last five years, demonstrating significant recent increases.43 Given the
benefits for employers, an increasing percentage of the workforce will likely
be required to submit to arbitration as a condition of employment.44 The
rapidly growing trend of employee arbitration makes understanding its in-
tersection with labor and employment law essential.
Scholars and policymakers also struggle to gather concrete data on the
use of prelitigation settlements in labor and employment litigation. No laws
require disclosure of prelitigation settlements in labor and employment liti-
gation, and the circumstances surrounding the agreements are typically se-
cret.45 These settlements typically arise when an employee sends a demand
letter to an employer regarding potential claims.46 In response, the employer
offers a paid settlement in exchange for the employee releasing all claims and
promising to not disparage the employer.47 Similar to arbitration proceed-
ings, predispute settlement negotiations allow employers to prevent negative
public exposure.48 But confidentiality must typically be bargained for in pre-
dispute settlements, unlike in arbitral proceedings.49 Accordingly, the em-
ployee can monetize what the company sees as collateral damage inherent to
38 . See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Un-
conscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 219 (2004).
39 . See id . at 220.
40. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Set-
tlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 870 (2007).
41 . See Doré, supra note 36.
42. COLVIN, supra note 6, at 2. Low-wage employees are most likely to be subject to
these agreements—approximately 65 percent of workers making less than $13.00 per hour
must arbitrate any relevant claims against their employers. Id .
43. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Metastasization of Mandatory Arbitration, 94 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 3, 10 (2019).
44 . See Estlund, supra note 14, at 706.
45 . SeeMoss, supra note 40, at 882–83.
46. Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 5
J. ASS’N LEGALWRITINGDIRECTORS, Fall 2008, at 32, 33–34.
47. Russell-Kraft, supra note 6.
48. Moss, supra note 40, at 871.
49 . See id . at 880.
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litigation, leading employees and employers to feel that the process is mutu-
ally beneficial.50 Although precise figures are hard to obtain given the private
nature of these settlements, data from plaintiffs’ attorneys suggest that ap-
proximately four out of five claims settle before a lawsuit is ever filed.51
C. Labor and Employment Law Enforcement Challenges Associated with
Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution
Both the nature of extrajudicial dispute resolution and its implementa-
tion present challenges to enforcing employment discrimination laws via
private litigation. Arbitration may reduce the likelihood that aggrieved em-
ployees seek redress at all, as they perceive, often correctly, that the odds are
stacked against them. And confidentiality norms in both arbitration and pre-
litigation settlements lead to information suppression and a reduced incen-
tive for employers to comply with employment discrimination laws.
For plaintiffs and their counsel, arbitration is riskier than litigation.
Plaintiffs are less likely to prevail, and when they do, their awards are typical-
ly smaller than they would be in litigation.52 The low likelihood of success
discourages plaintiffs’ attorneys from taking on clients bound by arbitration
clauses, given that those lawyers often rely on contingency fees that require
counsel to internalize the risk.53 Accordingly, many employees who have
faced legitimate discrimination are unlikely to file a claim in arbitration. By
discouraging potential claims, arbitration frustrates the fundamental pur-
pose of employment discrimination laws by weakening the laws’ deterrent
effects and reducing the potential to hold violators accountable.54
While claim suppression is unique to arbitration, the confidentiality
norms associated with both arbitration and prelitigation settlement agree-
ments also impede the enforcement of employment discrimination laws.
Even in private legal disputes, courts operate under a presumption in favor
of public access to judicial records.55 This presumption predates the Consti-
50 . See id .
51. Russell-Kraft, supra note 6 (“David Sanford, a prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer who
works primarily on discrimination cases, estimated that ‘about 80 to 90 percent’ of the cases he
takes on are resolved confidentially before a lawsuit can even be filed. These are claims that will
never be publicly known, and Sanford’s figure is typical.”).
52 . See Estlund, supra note 14, at 688 (noting that employees prevailed 19.1 percent of
the time in arbitration, with a median award of $36,500, compared to 29.7 percent of the time
in federal court, with a median award of $176,426).
53 . See id . at 702.
54 . See id .
55. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993);
Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988).
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tution and serves a number of government interests.56 Public access to court
records, for instance, promotes confidence in the judicial system.57
The secrecy surrounding both arbitration and pre-suit settlement shields
information of public importance, posing challenges to private enforcement
schemes.58 That employment discrimination statutes like Title VII, the ADA,
and the FMLA are all enforced through private litigation further emphasizes
the importance of public access to dispute records. Litigation under these
statutes, in addition to increasing confidence in the judicial system, also
serves an express public accountability function.59
Because of these important policy objectives, there should be a height-
ened presumption of public access to dispute records in labor and employ-
ment cases. Yet the confidentiality associated with extrajudicial dispute
resolution fundamentally undermines the social purpose that labor and em-
ployment laws are designed to serve. Confidential, out-of-court resolution of
employment discrimination claims cannot serve the same social purpose as
litigation.60 Employee arbitration agreements reduce an employer’s liability
and thus disincentivize employers from complying with employment dis-
crimination statutes, making it more likely that employers will violate work-
ers’ rights.61 This Note therefore examines mechanisms designed to improve
employer accountability in a world of private dispute resolution.
II. EXPLORING THEUSE OFQUITAMACTIONS TO ENFORCE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Qui tam laws can help preserve the power of employment discrimina-
tion laws that are enforced primarily through private litigation. In particular,
qui tam statutes maintain public transparency and deter violations of stat-
utes like Title VII, the ADA, and the FMLA. Like private rights of action, qui
tam actions compensate individuals who identify legal violations. But unlike
plaintiffs in private rights of action, plaintiffs in qui tam actions sue on be-
half of the government, not on behalf of themselves.62 Because qui tam ac-
tions and private rights of action protect different interests, courts handle
56 . Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678.
57. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660 (3d Cir.
1991). Courts seal or protect records from public view only when the “disclosure will work a
clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure.” Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen,
733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984).
58 . See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1211, 1231 (2006).
59 . See Glover, supra note 1, at 1153.
60 . See Notice No . 915 .002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Em-
ployment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, U.S. EEOC (July 10, 1997),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html [https://perma.cc/YW5Z-VZNK].
61 . See id .
62 . See id .
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waivability and arbitrability of such claims differently.63 Accordingly, struc-
turing employment discrimination laws to create qui tam enforcement
mechanisms may adequately address the dwindling enforcement power of
private rights of action.
A. The Historical Development of Modern Qui Tam Actions
Qui tam laws can be traced back to thirteenth-century England.64 In-
jured individuals brought claims on behalf of themselves and the Crown as a
strategy for having their cases heard in respected royal courts, which typical-
ly heard only matters pertaining to government interests.65 About a century
later, royal courts expanded jurisdiction to hear purely private matters and
the use of these dual actions declined.66 At the same time, Parliament began
enacting statutes allowing “informers” to recover a share of relevant fines,
even if the informer himself was not injured.67
Borrowing from their English counterparts, American legislators began
enacting qui tam laws in the colonial period.68 Congress first passed the False
Claims Act (FCA) in the nineteenth century, but the law did not take its
modern form until 1986.69 In an attempt to curb notorious levels of fraud
among military contractors, Congress strengthened the FCA by dramatically
increasing penalties and the percentage of fines a successful relator could re-
cover.70 Congress also removed barriers to bringing qui tam actions by elim-
inating both the “any prior government knowledge” defense (which barred
qui tam suits if any government official had knowledge of the fraud) and the
63. “Waivability” refers to the enforceability of a contractual waiver of the ability to
bring a particular type of claim. For instance, the Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v . Concep-
cion that a consumer’s contractual promise not to bring any class claims in either arbitration or
litigation was valid and enforceable. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). “Arbitrability” refers to the enforcea-
bility of contracts promising to bring a legal claim in an arbitral forum instead of a court. For
example, in Iskanian v . CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, the court held that an employee’s
promise to arbitrate any claims was not valid as to claims arising under PAGA. 327 P.3d 129
(Cal. 2014).
64. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel . Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000).
65 . Id .
66 . Id . at 775.
67 . Id .
68 . Id . at 776.
69. False Claims Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153; An Act to
Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696
(1863). The FCA allows any person to serve as a private attorney general and bring a claim
against a federal government contractor for fraud. John R. Thomas Jr. et al., The False Claims
Act Past, Present, and Future, FED. LAW., Dec. 2016, at 64, 65. As a reward for enforcing the
law on behalf of the government, those bringing the claims receive a percentage of any money
recovered in litigation or settlement. Id .
70. James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1272–74 (2013).
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requirement that even a successful relator pay attorney’s fees.71 In addition,
Congress established protections for relators by barring retaliation against
whistleblowers.72 These changes revitalized qui tam claims as a litigation de-
vice.73
Recognizing the efficacy of using qui tam actions to enforce public law,
California enacted PAGA in 2003 to enforce its labor code.74 The legislature
identified two problems. First, many labor code violations were punishable
only by criminal misdemeanors rather than civil penalties.75 Because district
attorneys tended to devote their limited resources to prosecuting violent
crimes, labor code violations often went unpunished.76 Second, there were
inadequate government resources to support enforcement of those statutes
that did create civil penalties.77
PAGA addressed both of these issues. Because California’s labor agen-
cies were underfunded, the legislature determined that “it was therefore in
the public interest to allow aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys
general, to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.”78 Under PAGA,
an aggrieved employee may bring a representative claim on behalf of herself
and a class of similarly situated employees seeking civil penalties.79 If the
claim prevails, PAGA distributes 75 percent of the civil penalties to Califor-
nia’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and the remain-
ing 25 percent to the aggrieved employees.80
71 . Id . at 1274.
72 . Id .
73 . Id . at 1275.
74. Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, ch. 906, 2003 Cal. Stat. 6628
(codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2698–99.6 (West 2011 & Supp. 2019)); Arias v.
Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 929 (Cal. 2009). Notably, PAGA currently faces a challenge to its
constitutionality. In November 2018, the California Business & Industrial Alliance (CABIA)
filed suit in the Orange County Superior Court against the State of California challenging the
constitutionality of PAGA. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Cal. Bus. & Indus.
All. v. Becerra, No. 30-2018-01035180-CU-JR-CXC (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2018). Specifical-
ly, the complaint alleged that PAGA fines were excessive and in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id . at 48–49. In addition, the complaint asserted that the law violated
the separation of powers, due process, and equal protection rights articulated in the California
Constitution. Id . at 41–42, 46–48, 52–54. This lawsuit is unlikely to succeed given that in Is-
kanian, a case that continues to be widely cited by California state courts, the California Su-
preme Court denied the challenge to PAGA’s constitutionality. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A.,
LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 154 (Cal. 2014), cert . denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015).
75 . Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 146.
76 . Id .
77 . Id .
78 . Arias, 209 P.3d at 929.
79 . Id . at 930.
80 . Id .; see, e .g ., Bernstein v. Virgin Am., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983, 992–93 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (awarding $25 million for PAGA claim brought by California flight attendants em-
ployed by Virgin America, 25 percent of which was shared among the aggrieved employees);
Revised Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release at 11, Singer v. Postmates, Inc., No.
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B. Waivability of Qui Tam Claims
Employers use waiver agreements to minimize their liability for viola-
tions of employment discrimination laws, qui tam or otherwise. A common
type of waiver requires that an employee waive their right to bring certain
types of claims against their employer in any forum.81 Whether employers’
attempts to enforce such waivers will succeed is informed by the Supreme
Court’s Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) jurisprudence.
The Court has interpreted the FAA to require that arbitration agree-
ments be enforced on their own terms.82 But this general rule has a number
of exceptions that render waiver provisions unenforceable. For example, the
FAA’s savings clause requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements “save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.”83 Additionally, under the Court’s “effective vindication doctrine,” ar-
bitration agreements are invalid when they prevent a party from vindicating
their substantive rights afforded by federal statute.84
Many arbitration agreements contain class action waiver provisions.85 In
such contracts, parties agree to submit any claims to individual arbitration
and forego the ability to bring a class claim.86 Recent Supreme Court juris-
prudence has made clear that that these waiver provisions are overwhelm-
ingly valid.87 Qui tam actions resemble class actions insofar as they involve
one party complaining about injury to individuals other than the plaintiff.
This creates the troubling possibility that courts would simply enforce waiv-
ers of qui tam-style claims as they do for class claims. This Section analyzes
the Court’s treatment of class and representative claim waivers both in and
out of the qui tam context to demonstrate how federal courts treat the wai-
vability of qui tam-style actions more broadly.
4:15-cv-01284-JSW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017) (describing a court-approved settlement that
awarded 25 percent of a $100,000 settlement to several Postmates employees who filed a PAGA
claim for violation of California’s minimum wage law).
81 . See COLVIN, supra note 6, at 2 (“Of the employers who require mandatory arbitra-
tion, 30.1 percent also include class action waivers in their procedures . . . .”).
82. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
83. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
84 . See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 280
(2015).
85. COLVIN, supra note 6, at 2.
86 . See Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitra-
tion Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665,
700–01 (2010); see also, e .g ., PEOPLE’S PARITY PROJECT, supra note 9 (“Covered Disputes
MUST be arbitrated only on an individual basis. . . . Disputes . . . MUST be arbitrated in sepa-
rate, individual proceedings.”).
87 . See, e .g ., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333.
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1. Class Action Waiver Jurisprudence
Beginning with the landmark case AT&T v . Concepcion, the Supreme
Court has consistently enforced agreements in which parties waive their
right to bring class claims in either litigation or arbitration.88 In Concepcion,
plaintiffs invoked a California rule providing that adhesion contracts89 con-
taining class action waivers are unconscionable.90 They argued that any arbi-
tration clause contained in an adhesion contract must allow plaintiffs to
arbitrate claims on a class-wide basis.91 The Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, stating that the FAA preempts any state rule invalidating class ac-
tion waivers.92 The Court reasoned that Congress, in adopting the FAA,
intended to favor efficient and informal arbitration proceedings.93 Arbitra-
tion’s informality, the Court held, was at odds with formalistic and often
cumbersome class proceedings.94
Confirming the legality of class action waivers, the Court held in Epic
Systems Corp . v . Lewis that such waivers were valid even in employment con-
tracts.95 Plaintiffs argued that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pro-
tects employees’ right to engage in “collective action” in the form of class
arbitration or litigation.96 The Court disagreed, holding that Congress passed
the NLRA to protect collective bargaining.97 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that Congress did not intend to include class arbitration in its protec-
tion of employees’ “other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining.”98
Finally, the Court’s American Express Co . v . Italian Colors Restaurant
decision restricted the applicability of the effective vindication doctrine.99
This doctrine requires that parties to arbitration agreements have some fo-
rum, judicial or arbitral, to vindicate their statutory rights.100 But in Italian
Colors, the Court held that, even when a plaintiff’s individual arbitration
costs would exceed the maximum possible recovery for a federal statutory
88 . Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
89. An adhesion contract is “[a] standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be
signed by another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the con-
tract with little choice about the terms.” Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019).
90 . See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337–38.
91 . Id .
92 . See id . at 352.
93 . See id . at 348.
94 . Id . at 349–50.
95. 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
96 . See Epic Sys ., 138 S. Ct. at 1622.
97 . Id . at 1630.
98 . See id . at 1617, 1632.
99. 570 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2013).
100 . See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985) (articulating the effective vindication doctrine).
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violation, courts should still enforce the class action waiver.101 The Court re-
jected the plaintiff’s contention that the waiver prevented them from effec-
tively vindicating their federal statutory rights.102 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia noted that high costs, even costs exceeding the prospective re-
covery, do not foreclose plaintiffs’ ability to vindicate their rights.103 Formal-
ly, plaintiffs are still able to pursue arbitration, but only at a prohibitively
high cost.104
2. Validity of Representative Action Waivers Under PAGA
Analyzing how federal and state courts treat waiver of PAGA claims
provides valuable insight into the potential efficacy of a qui tam employment
discrimination regime. In Iskanian v . CLS Transportation of Los Angeles,
LLC, a plaintiff-employee filed suit against his employer under PAGA, alleg-
ing a litany of wage and workplace violations.105 But because the plaintiff had
signed an arbitration agreement that included both a class and representative
action waiver, the defendant-employer moved to compel individual arbitra-
tion.106 Although neither party disputed that the waiver encompassed repre-
sentative PAGA claims, the plaintiff argued that such waivers were invalid
under state law and that the FAA did not preempt those state laws.107
The court first looked to California state laws governing waivability of
statutory rights to determine the validity of the waiver.108 One statute stated
that the courts would not enforce contracts rooted in exempting a party
from responsibility for violating a law.109 Another statute stated that private
individuals cannot waive the benefit of a law enacted for the public’s bene-
fit.110 Given the public purpose PAGA was intended to serve, the court held
that an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action was unwaivable.111 To allow
such a waiver would “disable one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing
101 . Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 238–39.
102 . Id . at 235.
103 . Id .
104 . See id . at 238–39.
105. 327 P.3d 129, 133 (Cal. 2014). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that CLS “failed to
pay overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, reimburse business expenses, provide accurate and
complete wage statements, or pay final wages in a timely manner.” Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 133.
106 . Id .
107 . Id . at 145.
108 . Id . at 148.
109. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2011) (“All contracts which have for their object, di-
rectly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to
the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against
the policy of the law.”).
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2016) (“Any one may waive the advantage of a law
intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened
by a private agreement.”).
111 . Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 153.
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the Labor Code” and effectively exempt employers from liability for legal
violations.112
In response, the defendant argued that the contract did not require
waiver of all PAGA claims, just those claims that are representative.113 There-
fore, the plaintiff could still bring individual claims against his employer but
was barred from bringing claims on behalf of other aggrieved employees.114
The court rejected this argument on the grounds that PAGA’s statutory lan-
guage appears to refer only to representative claims.115 Additionally, even if
the statute had created both individual and representative claims, the penal-
ties assessed against employers for individual claims would be insufficient to
deter employers from violating labor and employment laws.116 Because the
legislature identified systemic deterrence as a primary justification for enact-
ing PAGA, the ability to waive representative claims would frustrate its core
purpose.117
Having decided the question of PAGA’s applicability, the court then
turned to the issue of preemption. Given the supremacy of federal law, a
state law invalidating an arbitration agreement cannot be enforced if the
FAA preempts it.118 The FAA preempts any state law that interferes with its
fundamental purpose: ensuring efficient, streamlined resolution of private
disputes through arbitration.119 But the court held that PAGA actions are
disputes between an employer and a state agency, meaning they fall outside
the scope of an arbitration agreement, which binds only the employer and
the employee.120 Because the state agency and the employer never entered
into an arbitration agreement, the FAA did not preempt a state rule barring
the waiver of qui tam claims.121
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Iskanian approach.122 In Sakkab v . Lux-
ottica Retail, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA does not prevent “states
from authorizing qui tam actions to enforce state law” and found the Is-
kanian rule valid.123 This decision was consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
112 . Id . at 149.
113 . Id .
114 . Id .
115 . Id . (highlighting plaintiff’s argument that “the PAGA . . . authorizes an aggrieved
employee to file a claim ‘on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees’
does not permit an employee to file an individual claim” (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a)
(West Supp. 2019) (emphasis added by court))).
116 . Id . (citing Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 862 (Ct. App. 2011)).
117 . See id .
118 . Id .
119 . See AT&TMobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
120 . Iskanian, 327 P.3d at 149.
121 . See id . at 151.
122 . See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 803 F.3d 425, 439 (9th Cir. 2015); Her-
nandez v. DMSI Staffing, LLC, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1064–65 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
123 . Sakkab, 803 F.3d at 439–40. As of November 2018, no other circuit appears to have
entertained questions regarding the waivability of qui tam claims.
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jurisprudence holding waivers of the FCA invalid.124 In a 1995 opinion, the
court asserted that the sole purpose of qui tam actions, including FCA
claims, is to “vindicate the public interest” by “deterring fraud and returning
funds to the federal treasury.”125 The court wrote that allowing prefiling re-
leases of FCA claims, particularly when the government has not been made
aware of the allegations, would undermine the purpose of the FCA itself, to
inform the government of wrongdoing.126
C. Arbitrability of Qui Tam Claims
Even if courts refuse to enforce qui tam waivers, they may still subject
qui tam claims to arbitration. In many ways, the arbitration process—
shrouded in secrecy and designed to disincentivize the filing of claims—is
antithetical to the goals of a qui tam labor and employment discrimination
regime. But while arbitration may not be the ideal avenue through which to
file a qui tam claim, it can be done. With certain public protections in place,
arbitrated qui tam claims could still uphold the public purpose underlying
such claims. Because PAGA is among the most litigated state qui tam stat-
utes and the only one that governs labor code violations,127 analysis of its ar-
bitrability informs the potential arbitrability of a qui tam regime designed to
enforce employment discrimination laws.
1. Arbitrability of PAGA Claims
California state courts have consistently held that at least some PAGA
claims are not arbitrable.128 In Tanguilig v . Bloomingdale’s, the California
First District Court of Appeal held that a “PAGA claim cannot be ordered to
arbitration without the state’s consent.”129 The court reasoned that PAGA
124 . See United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 457 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006);
United States ex rel . Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 963 (9th Cir. 1995).
125 . Green, 59 F.3d at 968.
126 . Id . at 963. Notably, this holding would also prevent an employer from entering into
a prelitigation settlement with an employee that required the employee to release any claims or
keep the claims confidential. A qui tam legal structure could thus address the confidentiality
challenges associated with both arbitration and prelitigation settlements.
127 . See Chris Micheli, Private Attorneys General Act Lawsuits in California: A Review of
PAGA and Proposals for Reforming the “Sue Your Boss” Law, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 265, 265
(2018).
128 . See, e .g ., Hernandez v. Ross Stores, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485, 489 (Ct. App. 2016);
Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 360 (Ct. App. 2016); Williams v. Supe-
rior Court, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 83, 84 (Ct. App. 2015); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2015).
129 . See Tanguilig, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 360 (“ ‘[A] PAGA claim lies outside the FAA’s
coverage . . . .’ ” (quoting Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 151 (Cal. 2014))).
California’s judicial hierarchy includes superior courts (also known as trial courts), courts of
appeal, which are divided into six districts, and finally the California Supreme Court. See gen-
erally About California Courts, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/2113.htm
[https://perma.cc/X3GT-GEVL]. Unlike with the federal judiciary, published opinions of the
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plaintiffs merely act as proxies for the state, which is itself not a party to the
employment agreement.130 PAGA’s remedy structure bolsters this viewpoint:
plaintiffs are not suing for damages; rather, they are suing for civil penalties
largely payable to the state.131 PAGA disputes, therefore, lie outside the scope
of employment agreements mandating arbitration and cannot be submitted
to arbitration without California’s consent.132
The California Fifth District Court of Appeal complicated PAGA analy-
sis in Esparza v . KS Industries, L .P ., where an employee filed a lawsuit against
his employer on behalf of himself and other aggrieved employees.133 The
complaint asserted that KS Industries violated the California Labor Code by
failing to pay minimum and overtime wages to its employees, among other
charges.134 The plaintiff-employee sought recovery in the form of “unpaid
wages, civil penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs.”135 While the plain-
tiff asserted that PAGA plainly included recovered wages as a part of the civil
penalties, the defendant argued that this was merely an attempt to circum-
vent the arbitration agreement by masking the private dispute as a PAGA
claim.136
The Esparza court held that claims requesting victim-specific relief were
arbitrable because wage disputes are fundamentally private, and unpaid wag-
es could never be considered civil penalties.137 Because the FAA’s purpose
was to encourage arbitration of private disputes, any claim that could be
brought privately could be arbitrated.138 Nevertheless, the court did find that
the civil penalties of $50 for any initial violation and $100 per subsequent vi-
olation per pay period constituted civil penalties rather than victim-specific
relief like backpay.139 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims for civil fines could
not be submitted to arbitration.140
In a nearly identical claim, a different California appellate district
reached a contrary conclusion regarding the arbitrability of claims for un-
courts of appeal are binding on all superior courts. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court,
369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 1962). If several courts of appeal are divided on an issue before a supe-
rior court, however, the trial court judge may exercise their discretion and choose to follow the
guidance of either appellate court. Id . Published opinions from one court of appeal do not bind
any other court of appeal. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 870–71 (Ct. App.
2001).
130 . Tanguilig, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 360 (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,
289 (2002)).
131 . Id .
132 . Id .
133. 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 594, 598 (Ct. App. 2017).
134 . Esparza, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598.
135 . Id . at 599.
136 . Id .
137 . Id . at 607.
138 . Id .
139 . Id . at 606–07.
140 . Id . at 607.
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paid wages.141 In Lawson v . ZB, N .A ., the court disagreed with the analysis in
Esparza because the relevant Labor Code provision created no private right
of action, express or implied.142 Because the statute giving rise to the cause of
action contained no private right of action, the court held that arbitration
should not have been compelled.143
Federal courts have been even less consistent than state courts regarding
the arbitrability of PAGA claims. In Valdez v . Terminix, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted the Sakkab holding to mean that all PAGA claims were arbitra-
ble.144 Specifically, the court held that since the claims arose out of the em-
ployment relationship, the arbitration agreement covered the dispute.145 In
Mandviwala v . Five Star Quality Care, the Ninth Circuit came to the oppo-
site conclusion, holding that PAGA claims potentially giving rise to civil
penalties could not be subject to compelled arbitration.146 However, the
court indicated that the question was one of state law, and therefore the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was not binding.147 Muddling the jurispru-
dence further, the Ninth Circuit’s prior opinion held that PAGA arbitrability
could only be resolved by examining the FAA, creating a federal question.148
2. Arbitrability of FCA Claims
Given the internal contradictions within the opinions deciding the arbi-
trability of PAGA claims, it is difficult to predict how courts would respond
to a similar state qui tam regime governing employment discrimination
claims. Accordingly, this Note next examines the jurisprudence surrounding
the arbitrability of federal qui tam claims to gain insight into the arbitrability
of state qui tam claims. Although the preemption analysis will differ, the rea-
soning behind whether arbitration is consistent with the federal statute can
shed light on the potential effectiveness of comparable state laws.
Federal case law examining the arbitrability of federal qui tam claims is
inconclusive. Yet defendants facing FCA claims have sought to compel arbi-
141. Lawson v. ZB, N.A., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 626 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom . ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 2019 WL 4309684 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2019).
142 . Compare id . at 624 (finding that a private right of action is not expressly authorized,
and should not be implied, under § 558), with CAL. LAB. CODE § 203(b) (West Supp. 2019)
(expressly authorizing a private right of action).
143 . Lawson, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 624–25. Subsequent to the writing of this Note, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court criticized this analysis based on its “close, contextual analysis of the
[PAGA] statutory scheme,” adopting Esparza’s view of unpaid wages as outside PAGA’s civil
penalty. See ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 2019 WL 4309684, at *6–12 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2019). Ac-
cordingly, any PAGA claims seeking victim-specific relief can be arbitrated pursuant to the
relevant employment contract. The fact that the lower California courts split on this issue,
though, may still be relevant in assessing how other states may interpret qui tam statutes.
144. Valdez v. Terminix Int’l Co., 681 F. App’x 592 (9th Cir. 2017).
145 . Id . at 594–95.
146. 723 F. App’x 415, 417 (9th Cir. 2018).
147 . Mandviwala, 723 F. App’x at 417.
148 . Valdez, 681 F. App’x at 593.
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tration on remarkably few occasions. This is despite the fact that, ostensibly,
individuals in the best position to inform the government about ongoing
fraud would be employees of companies engaging in the illicit activity. In the
limited number of cases that do address arbitrability of FCA claims, courts
have tended to find that the claims belong to the government, not the rela-
tor.149 Because the government is not a party to the arbitration agreement,
the claims cannot be compelled to arbitration.150
In the most recent federal appellate case addressing this issue, the Ninth
Circuit skirted the arbitrability question and resolved the claim through a
textual analysis of the arbitration agreement itself.151 In United States ex rel .
Welch v . My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, an employee of the functional
therapy company filed a sealed complaint against her employer, alleging vio-
lations of the federal FCA and the Nevada FCA.152 She alleged that her em-
ployer presented fraudulent claims to Medicare and Tricare (another
government health program) by treating patients who could not benefit
from services, overbilling, and falsifying medical records.153 When the relator
joined My Left Foot, she signed an arbitration agreement promising to arbi-
trate claims that “ar[ose] out of ‘or related to’ the employment relationship”
or employment context.154 The court noted, however, that the employer
could have written the contract to include “any and all disputes whatsoev-
er.”155 The employer’s own contract language ultimately limited the scope of
the agreement.156
The Ninth Circuit then examined two cases from the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits addressing the same question.157 Both circuits determined that a
sexual assault that occurred in the workplace did not “arise out of” or “relate
to” the employment relationship.158 Even though the sexual assault would
not have occurred but for the employment, there was no direct connection
between the assault and employment.159 Indeed, the courts reasoned that the
defendant could have sexually assaulted the plaintiff even in the absence of
149 . See Stoner v. Santa Clara Cty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007);
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 138 F. Supp. 2d 938, 939 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Mikes v. Strauss, 889
F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). But see Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12–cv–
63, 2013 WL 394875, at *6–7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013).
150 . See Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126.
151. United States ex rel . Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d 791,
794 (9th Cir. 2017).
152 . Id . at 795.
153 . Id .
154 . Id . at 794, 798.
155 . Id . at 797.
156 . Id . at 798.
157 . Id . at 799.
158 . Id .
159 . Id .
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any employment relationship.160 The Ninth Circuit found Welch’s case anal-
ogous because the relator could have brought the case even if she had never
been employed by My Left Foot.161 That Welch would not have learned of
the fraud but for the employment was “immaterial” because she could have
learned about it through other means.162 The arbitration agreement did not
cover all claims related to the employer; instead, it covered those related to
the employment.163 Since the arbitration did not encompass the claim at is-
sue, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.164
Welch suggests that when anyone—not just an employee of a company
engaging in misconduct—can serve as a relator, courts may find that the re-
sulting qui tam claim does not flow from the employment relationship. But
the case leaves open the possibility that employers could simply broaden the
language of arbitration agreements to include any dispute between the par-
ties regardless of how the claims arose. Whether such a sweeping agreement
would be enforceable would be a matter of state law—by way of the FAA’s
savings clause—and therefore could vary by jurisdiction.
3. Arbitrability of Employment Disputes Involving the EEOC
Because neither PAGA nor FCA jurisprudence provide definite conclu-
sions on the arbitrability of qui tam claims, this Note next analyzes the arbi-
trability of claims involving the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to examine the relationship among private parties,
employers, and the federal government in the enforcement of employment
discrimination laws. In employment discrimination cases involving federal
claims, aggrieved employees must first submit their complaints to the
EEOC.165 When the EEOC finds reasonable cause that an employee’s rights
were violated, it may choose to pursue relief on behalf of the aggrieved em-
ployee.166 If the agency chooses not to pursue the claim itself, the complain-
ant may file the claim on their own.167
The Supreme Court took up the question of arbitrability of claims
brought by the EEOC in a 2002 case, EEOC v . Waffle House.168 In that case,
an employee filed a charge with the EEOC alleging disability discrimina-
160 . Id .
161 . Id .
162 . Id .
163 . Id .
164 . Id . at 800.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012). The EEOC is a federal agency created under Title
VII that administers and enforces laws regarding workplace discrimination. Michael Z. Green,
Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Pro-
cessing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2001).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b)(1) (2018).
168. 534 U.S. 279.
November 2019] Improving Employer Accountability 305
tion.169 After the EEOC unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a resolution
with Waffle House, the agency filed suit in federal court.170 Waffle House
filed a motion to compel arbitration, citing an agreement the aggrieved em-
ployee had signed.171 The district court denied the motion, asserting that the
employee’s actual agreement contained no promise to arbitrate.172 While the
Fourth Circuit found that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement did
exist, it ultimately concluded that the EEOC could not be compelled to arbi-
trate all claims because the EEOC was not a party to the agreement.173 In an
attempt to give some effect to the arbitration agreement, the court held that
the EEOC was prohibited from seeking victim-specific relief.174 Therefore,
when an aggrieved employee signs an arbitration agreement, the EEOC is
only entitled to pursue injunctive relief.175
Noting a circuit split on the arbitrability of claims brought by the EEOC,
the Supreme Court granted the EEOC’s petition for a writ of certiorari.176
The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that the EEOC was entitled
to pursue injunctive and victim-specific relief on behalf of the aggrieved em-
ployee in court.177 The Court relied heavily on the EEOC’s control over the
direction of the claim.178 Specifically, the agency maintains exclusive juris-
diction over the claim for 180 days and is not required to seek the employee’s
consent before prosecuting the claim.179 Since the claims were solely within
the purview of the EEOC, the EEOC was not a proxy for the employee and
thus not bound by the arbitration agreement.180 Waffle House suggests that
regulatory enforcement agencies like the EEOC operate as more than stand-
ins for employees, even when they seek relief that the employees could ob-
tain individually. The Waffle House Court’s reasoning offers guidance as to
how courts might handle the converse situation, in which individuals seek
relief on behalf of the government.
169 . Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
170 . Id .
171 . Id . at 283–84.
172. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:96–2739–O, 1998 WL 35168489, at *2
(D.S.C. Mar. 23, 1998).
173. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811–12 (4th Cir. 1999).
174 . Id . at 813.
175 . Id .
176 . Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285. Compare EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177
F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing the EEOC to seek all remedies on behalf of an employee
bound by an arbitration agreement), withMerrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nixon,
210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000) (proscribing the EEOC from seeking monetary relief for the em-
ployee but permitting it to seek injunctive relief), and EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156
F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
177 . Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 285, 291–92.
178 . Id . at 291–92.
179 . Id .
180 . Id . at 297–98.
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In sum, analysis of litigation surrounding PAGA, the FCA, and claims
brought by the EEOC demonstrates the strengths and shortcomings of em-
ployment discrimination laws, particularly those designed to protect em-
ployees. Legislatures interested in enacting such laws must carefully examine
the likelihood that claims brought under them will be subject to enforceable
waivers and arbitration. To ensure their effectiveness, the statutes must be
structured to anticipate challenges on both fronts.
III. EFFECTIVEUSE OF STATEQUITAM LEGISLATION TO ENFORCE
EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION LAWS
Both public and private enforcement mechanisms for employment dis-
crimination have been underused in recent decades. This underenforcement
stems in large part from barriers to traditional means of enforcement. Cash-
strapped attorney general offices often lack the resources to respond to labor
and employment claims, and employees pursuing private rights of action are
increasingly stymied by restrictive arbitration agreements.181 Where a law’s
primary enforcement mechanisms are ineffective, its deterrent effect is seri-
ously weakened. Without a likelihood of economic consequences, employers
have little incentive to comply with cost-imposing laws.
Though the federal government has not prioritized addressing the un-
derenforcement of employment discrimination laws, state legislatures have a
different set of political priorities. States may not face the same bureaucratic
barriers to enacting legislation designed to address these underenforcement
concerns.182 As Part II explained, whistleblower laws offer one avenue
through which states may combat barriers to enforcement. As of the writing
of this Note, California is the only state to have used qui tam legislation in an
attempt to enforce employment discrimination laws.183 Although imperfect,
California’s PAGA offers a useful starting point for looking at how states
might develop their own qui tam regimes.184 This Part draws on the PAGA,
181 . See Terri Gerstein & Marni von Wilpert, State Attorneys General Can Play Key Roles
in Protecting Workers’ Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 7, 2018), https://www.epi.org/
publication/state-attorneys-general-can-play-key-roles-in-protecting-workers-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/F7FJ-HY4A] (finding that only six states and the District of Columbia have any staff
in the attorney general’s office dedicated to enforcing labor laws). Because federal agencies like
the EEOC and the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor have been stretched
thin, state attorney general offices can play a key complementary role in enforcing employment
violations where the federal government cannot. See id .
182 . See, e .g ., Karla Walter et al., States at Work: Progressive State Policies to Rebuild the
Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (Mar. 21, 2013, 8:09 AM),
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2013/03/21/57375/states-at-
work-progressive-state-policies-to-rebuild-the-middle-class/ [https://perma.cc/Z92J-2CZQ]
(discussing the important role states play in shaping economic policy).
183. Micheli, supra note 127, at 265.
184 . See Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2698
(West 2011). Although this Note examines the potential of applying qui tam legislation to em-
ployment discrimination laws, there is no reason such a structure could not also be used to
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FCA, and EEOC case law discussed in the prior Section to develop an outline
for an effective state qui tam statute. Section III.A articulates strategies states
can employ to ensure qui tam claims cannot be waived. Section III.B then
identifies mechanisms that can help states address accountability challenges
associated with private dispute resolution. Finally, Section III.C provides
recommendations for avoiding preemption by the FAA.
A. Crafting State Qui Tam Laws to Avoid Waivability
To ensure that the prospective state law possesses real enforcement
power, it should prevent employers from being able to compel employees, as
a condition of their employment, to waive their right to bring legal claims. If
courts were to find waivers of state qui tam claims valid, the regime’s en-
forcement power would be virtually destroyed. States could, however, make
such legislation more resistant to waivability challenges by clearly stating the
public enforcement purpose that the law serves.
In every state, courts render contracts that contravene public policy un-
enforceable.185 Because courts often rely on legislative history to understand
the public policy aims of a statute, state legislatures considering a qui tam
regime should take care to clearly articulate the rationale for such legislation.
Iskanian, in which an employer sought to enforce a waiver of representative
PAGA claims, is instructive. The court examined the purpose PAGA was de-
signed to serve to determine its relationship to the state’s public policy.186
The court cited PAGA’s legislative history in which legislators detailed the
state’s limited capacity to enforce labor law violations and proposed a qui
tam regime as a solution.187 Similarly, state legislatures considering enacting
qui tam laws should clearly state the purpose that the legislation will serve.188
Legislative pronouncement alone would likely be insufficient to sustain a
finding of a public purpose if the content of the law did not support the same
conclusion. Accordingly, states should also take steps to ensure that the pro-
posed legislation substantively works to vindicate the goal of enforcing state
labor and employment laws to maintain a fair and competitive economy. For
example, the legislative language and structure of PAGA played a significant
role in convincing the Iskanian court to invalidate the employer’s PAGA
enforce other public interest laws. For instance, while PAGA prohibits employers from paying
employees less because of their sex, it also enforces wage and hour rules. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2699(a) (West Supp. 2019) (creating a private right of action for any aggrieved employee
where the Labor and Workforce Development Agency would otherwise be permitted to en-
force a civil penalty); California Equal Pay Act, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(k)(1) (West Supp.
2019) (establishing an employee’s right to share wage information with fellow employees);
CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.7(b) (West Supp. 2019) (providing for meal or rest periods).
185 . See Farshad Ghodoosi, The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the
Public Policy Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements, 94 NEB. L. REV. 685,
697 (2016).
186 . See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 149 (Cal. 2014).
187 . Id . at 146.
188 . See id .
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waiver.189 Relying on PAGA’s legislative language, which empowered citi-
zens to bring representative claims to recover civil penalties rather than indi-
vidualized damages, the court held that PAGA plaintiffs were truly serving as
deputized attorneys general rather than as private litigants seeking to make
themselves whole.190 The court also deemed it legislatively significant that,
before bringing a PAGA claim, employees were required to provide written
notice to the LWDA and give the department the opportunity to bring a civil
action itself.191 In reaching its decision to invalidate PAGA waivers, the court
held that such waivers would frustrate the law’s public policy aims and were
thus unenforceable pursuant to state law.192
In creating a qui tam regime, states can make a number of design choic-
es that enable courts to easily understand the legislation’s public regulatory
purpose. States should begin by creating representative claims either follow-
ing California’s approach or through the more traditional qui tam relator
structure.193 By formally identifying these claims as ones in which plaintiffs
act on behalf of the government rather than themselves, the legislature clear-
ly communicates that the plaintiffs are working to vindicate the public inter-
est.194 To further crystallize the public role that state qui tam actions would
serve, any proposed statute should assess civil penalties against violators ra-
ther than award individual damages. A majority of fines recovered from qui
tam enforcement actions should be funneled back to the state labor depart-
ment; only a small fraction of the money—though enough to incentivize
bringing claims—should go to the individual plaintiff or relator.195
In addition to designing the complaint and recovery structure to high-
light the public focus of the law, state legislatures would be wise to include
statutory language and procedures that further evince this motive. For in-
stance, like California,196 a state may wish to give its labor enforcement agen-
cy exclusive jurisdiction over relevant qui tam claims for a certain amount of
time. A notice requirement, in which aggrieved employees must inform their
189 . Id . at 146, 149.
190 . Id . at 146.
191 . Id . at 146–47.
192 . Id . at 149.
193. California created representative actions whereby an aggrieved employee could
bring a claim on behalf of herself and other similarly situated employees. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2699(a) (West Supp. 2019).
194. Lawson v. ZB, N.A., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 624 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom . ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 2019 WL 4309684 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2019). Com-
pare to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012), which has clear public policy goals but uses a
traditional plaintiff-defendant structure. Title VII claims are subject to arbitration. See Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001).
195. In PAGA cases, 25 percent of recovered penalties are distributed amongst aggrieved
employees, and the remaining 75 percent goes to the State of California. CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2699(i) (West Supp. 2019). In FCA cases, the relator receives anywhere between 15 and 30
percent of the recovery. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
196. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2019).
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state’s labor department of their intention to file suit, reinforces the idea that
the government first maintains control before choosing whether to delegate
enforcement to private citizens.197 Making explicit the statute’s public policy
goals helps insulate the law against waivability challenges.
Because state law generally controls the voidability of contracts, legisla-
tures should ensure that the language describing the law’s public purpose re-
flects the state’s determined grounds for invalidating private agreements that
are contrary to public policy. For example, California law holds that a party
can waive their right to bring a claim under a statute intended solely for that
party’s benefit but not a statute the legislature has created “for a public rea-
son.”198 Consequently, the legislature’s clear articulation of PAGA’s public
purpose enabled the statute to withstand waivability challenges.199 Other
states have phrased their public policy contractual enforcement exceptions
differently. For instance, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that individu-
als or groups cannot waive “a public obligation created by statute.”200 Ac-
cordingly, state legislators should tailor their statutory language to the
language courts have used in defining the public policy grounds for voiding
a contract. Congruence with state law makes the legislative intent clear to
courts. If the state qui tam law’s relevant rights and remedies are aligned
with its stated public interest goals, courts will be more likely to hold waivers
of such claims invalid on public policy grounds.
B. Crafting State Qui Tam Laws to Avoid Collateral Damage Associated
with Arbitration and Prelitigation Settlement
Even if courts invalidate state qui tam claim waivers on public policy
grounds, these claims could still face barriers to enforcement. Arbitration
and prelitigation settlement agreements reduce the efficacy of employment
discrimination laws by suppressing the number of complaints by aggrieved
employees and quashing public access to information regarding employer
misconduct.201 But with appropriate structures in place, these negative ef-
fects can be avoided even when courts enforce arbitration and prelitigation
settlement agreements. In crafting qui tam legislation, state legislatures
197. PAGA requires that aggrieved employees give written notice to the Labor and
Workforce Development Agency. Id . § 2699.3(a)(1)(A). Within sixty days, the agency will no-
tify the complainant whether it intends to investigate the complaint. Id . § 2699.3(a)(2)(A). Af-
ter receiving notice that the agency will not investigate, or sixty-five days after submission of
the complaint, the employee may commence a civil action. Id .
198. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 680 (Cal. 2000)
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2016)).
199 . Cf . id .
200. Pereira v. State Bd. of Educ., 37 A.3d 625, 655 (Conn. 2012) (quoting L’Heureux v.
Hurley, 168 A. 8, 11 (Conn. 1933)).
201 . See Estlund, supra note 14; Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrim-
ination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 929–30 (2006).
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should keep an eye toward enforcement and create public accountability re-
quirements to ensure that the law sufficiently vindicates the public interest.
Courts may be more likely to deem a qui tam claim outside the scope of
an employee arbitration agreement if the public purpose of the law is clearly
articulated and the government’s role clearly delineated.202 In cases where
courts have declined to compel qui tam claims to arbitration, analysis has
largely centered on the fact that the claims belong to the government, which
was not a party to the employment contract.203 But the legislature merely
stating that the claims belong to the government will likely prove insuffi-
cient, because the substance of the law and the procedures by which it is en-
forced must reflect the fundamentally public purpose the law serves.204
Courts may be more likely to find that the government, rather than the em-
ployee, fundamentally controls the qui tam claim when the legislation incor-
porates some or all of the following characteristics: (1) conferring exclusive,
time-limited jurisdiction of relevant claims to the state; (2) expressly declin-
ing to create a private right of action; and (3) allowing any person, not just
an employee, to bring a claim against a violator.
First, state legislators should consider creating a regime that relies on
government agencies like the EEOC or California’s LWDA to process com-
plaints filed by aggrieved employees.205 This regime supports the assertion
that the claims belong to the government and that private litigation is merely
a means the government has selected for public enforcement.206 In EEOC v .
Waffle House, the EEOC represented both the public interest in deterring
employers from engaging in unlawful and discriminatory conduct and the
private employee’s interest in recovery for the workplace injury.207 The rem-
edies sought—injunctive relief and individual damages—served both sets of
interests.208 Because the agency was “the master of its own case,” retaining
both exclusive jurisdiction over the claims for 180 days and the ability to
pursue claims without the aggrieved employee’s consent, it was within the
202 . See United States ex rel . Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d
791, 794 (9th Cir. 2017).
203 . See Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 138 F. Supp. 2d 938, 939 (N.D. Ohio 2001); Mikes
v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). But see Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co.,
No. 3:12–cv–63, 2013 WL 394875, at *6–7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013).
204 . See, e .g .,Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 755–56 (looking to the “primarily remedial” function
of the provision at issue in concluding that a claim for retaliatory discharge, unlike related qui
tam claims, belonged in arbitration).
205 . See Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699.3
(West Supp. 2019) (requiring aggrieved employees to provide written notice of the violation to
the employer and LWDA before being permitted to bring a civil action).
206 . See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002); Iskanian v. CLS Transp.
L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 149 (Cal. 2014).
207 . See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291.
208 . See id . at 290–91. Make-whole, victim-specific damages served the public interest
even if they also served the private interest. Id . at 291–92.
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agency’s authority to decide which remedies to pursue.209 As a nonparty to
the employee arbitration agreement, the EEOC could bring the claim against
the employer without being compelled into arbitration.210
Although state qui tam claims differ from EEOC claims in that an indi-
vidual, rather than a government agency, brings the action,Waffle House still
provides insight into how courts may determine who “owns” a particular
claim. States enacting their own qui tam laws will likely want to maintain
some ownership over the relevant claims to preserve the regime’s public en-
forcement goals. Waffle House indicates that when claims systems require
aggrieved employees to file complaints with the state agency that oversees
such claims, courts may be more inclined to find that the government exer-
cises substantial control over the claims and thus decline to compel arbitra-
tion.211
Second, states should consider declining to create a private right of ac-
tion when enacting qui tam legislation. Although the jurisprudence is not
entirely settled on the issue, courts seem to be more likely to decline to com-
pel arbitration when the qui tam statute creates no private right of action for
individuals.212 In Lawson v . ZB, N .A ., the California Fourth District Court of
Appeal determined that even though individuals may recover a portion of
penalties assessed in PAGA claims, plaintiffs must bring the claim on behalf
of the LWDA.213 Furthermore, the plaintiff in Lawson sued primarily to re-
cover only a designated fine for every week the employer was not compliant
with state overtime laws and rest breaks; recovered wages were secondary.214
Aggrieved employees have private means to recover lost wages but no pri-
vate avenue to assess civil penalties against their employer.215 Relying on that
fact, the court held that while PAGA claims for back pay could be compelled
to arbitration, equivalent claims for civil penalties could not.216
To clearly communicate the dominant public purpose of the law, states
should pass qui tam legislation that enacts only civil fines that an aggrieved
employee could not recover through any other means. This does not mean
the violations need be substantively different than if individual damages
were available; the state qui tam law could expressly prohibit underpayment
of wages, for example, which is something barred by other state laws.217 But
209 . Id . at 291.
210 . Id . at 292.
211 . See id . at 291–92.
212 . See Lawson v. ZB, N.A., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 613, 624 (Ct. App. 2017), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom . ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court, 2019 WL 4309684 (Cal. Sept. 12, 2019); Esparza
v. KS Indus., L.P., 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 2017).
213 . Lawson, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 620.
214 . Id . at 625.
215 . Id .
216 . Id .
217 . See, e .g ., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (West 2011) (providing a civil remedy for workers
paid less than the legal minimum wage independent of PAGA).
312 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:285
the state law must assess a unique penalty not akin to victim-specific, make-
whole relief.
Third, states may want to allow a broad range of individuals to bring qui
tam claims against employers. Although California chose to limit those who
can bring qui tam claims against employers to employees of those compa-
nies,218 other states considering adopting similar whistleblower legislation
may be wise to allow any knowledgeable individual to bring such claims. In
the most recent federal case involving a qui tam claim brought by an em-
ployee against a fraudulent employer, the Ninth Circuit declined to compel
arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration agreement was limited to “any
claim between the Company and Employee arising out of ‘or related to’ the
employment relationship.”219 Since any individual—employee or not—can
file suit for FCA violations, the court determined that the employee’s allega-
tions did not relate to her employment.220 This was despite the fact that the
employee only became aware of the fraud because of her employment rela-
tionship.221 Therefore, a statute allowing any knowledgeable individual to
bring a qui tam claim makes it less likely that the court will find that the
claim is covered by an arbitration agreement that governs disputes related to
employment.
Because compelled arbitration presents barriers to government en-
forcement of public interest laws, states enacting their own qui tam legisla-
tion may wish to broaden the class of individuals who can bring such claims.
If a state followed California’s lead by limiting those who can bring PAGA
claims to aggrieved employees, courts may be more likely to find that the
dispute arose out of the employment relationship and that the arbitration
agreement thus governed. Accordingly, states wishing to communicate to
courts the public nature of these qui tam claims should allow any individual
with personal knowledge of violations to bring such claims in court.
C. Tackling both Arbitration and Prelitigation Settlements
Confidentiality provisions are a common feature of both arbitration
agreements and prelitigation settlement agreements. These provisions
threaten enforcement of employment discrimination laws by suppressing
public knowledge of employers’ wrongful conduct. Accordingly, when pass-
ing qui tam legislation designed to enforce labor and employment laws,
states should establish structures that mitigate such information suppression.
States can do so in a way that simultaneously addresses the use of confidenti-
ality provisions in both contexts.
218. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(a) (West Supp. 2019).
219. United States ex rel . Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC, 871 F.3d 791,
798 (9th Cir. 2017).
220 . Id . at 799.
221 . Id .
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To preserve public knowledge of employment discrimination violations,
states could implement a complaint disclosure requirement. For instance, a
state could make public any complaint filed with the relevant state labor
agency or publish a list of employers under investigation for failing to com-
ply with relevant labor and employment laws.222 Another option is for states
to require court approval of any settlement agreements stemming from
complaints of qui tam violations.223 Finally, to deter employers from seeking
enforcement of confidentiality provisions, states should consider enacting
legislation invalidating contract provisions that prevent potential plaintiffs
from discussing relevant matters with the state labor agency.224 Ensuring that
information regarding potential violations is made available to the public
would help to prevent collective action problems and deter employers from
skirting liability in the court of public opinion.225
Legislation allowing employee grievances would not only mitigate the
genuine problem of information suppression but also further insulate qui
tam legislation from challenges that would reduce its efficacy. Rules that do
not attack arbitration on their face but are applied in a manner generally un-
favorable to arbitration are preempted by the FAA.226 States choosing to en-
act whistleblowers laws designed to enforce employment regulations must
ensure that their laws do not single out arbitration for unfavorable treat-
ment.227 Addressing the enforcement challenges posed by confidentiality
agreements would thus prevent the courts from misreading the legislation as
targeting arbitration.
222 . Cf . Allie Bidwell, Feds Target 55 Colleges in Sex Assault Investigation, U.S. NEWS
(May 1, 2014, 2:26 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2014/05/01/55-
colleges-under-investigation-for-possible-title-ix-sexual-violence-violations (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (discussing the Obama Administration’s decision to publish the list of
colleges and universities under investigation, but not yet found in violation, for mishandling
sexual assault and harassment complaints).
223 . See, e .g ., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699(l)(2) (West Supp. 2019) (“The superior court shall
review and approve any settlement of any civil action filed pursuant to [PAGA]. The proposed
settlement shall be submitted to the agency at the same time that it is submitted to the court.”).
Requiring settlement approval ensures both that the government is aware of any alleged viola-
tions and that any settlements sufficiently serve the public in the way the legislature contem-
plated. See id . § 2699.3(b)(4).
224. Federal courts have held that private agreements cannot interfere with the govern-
ment’s ability to enforce the law. Accordingly, a confidentiality agreement cannot prevent an
employee from filing a charge with the EEOC. E .g ., EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744–
45 (1st Cir. 1996).
225 . See RAJAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 2.
226. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). Accordingly, the Su-
preme Court found that the FAA preempted a California state law that invalidated waivers of
class claims because the formal procedures inherent to class claims undermined the purpose of
arbitration. Id . at 352.
227 . See id . at 341.
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CONCLUSION
As the use of extrajudicial dispute resolution of labor and employment
claims rises and state agency resources stagnate, many states struggle to ade-
quately enforce employment discrimination laws central to creating a
healthy and competitive economy. Qui tam laws can give states an addition-
al, cost-effective enforcement tool that is insulated from some of the en-
forcement challenges that extrajudicial dispute resolution poses. Both
California and the federal government have employed this technique to en-
force laws designed to curb fraud and labor law violations. Despite numer-
ous challenges to their validity, these qui tam regimes have consistently been
upheld by the courts as valid tools for enforcing public interest laws. States
struggling to deter employers from engaging in bad behavior should adopt
their own qui tam regimes to stymie the growing challenge of underen-
forcement of employment discrimination laws.
